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Abstract: In 1996, two investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the American Department of Justice reported non-competitive practices 
among market makers on the NASDAQ. These reports also mentioned the influence of the 
NASDAQ social structure on market makers’ behaviours. Most market makers adopted 
social norms in order to increase significantly their income at the expense of the customers. 
This paper aims to explain the rise and long-term effects of non-competitive practices, 
through the integration of a concrete view of “embeddedness” (Granovetter, 1985). We 
propose the use of game theory tools to achieve this goal. A rereading of Kreps’ model of 
reputation sheds light on its structural dimension and illustrates the way social structure 
governs individual behaviours.  
Key words: NASDAQ, non-competitive behaviours, embeddedness, social structure, 
game theory, reputation, trust.  
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1. Introduction 
In 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the American Department of 
Justice conducted investigations into market makers’ operations on the NASDAQ. These 
investigations reported non-competitive transactions (Revest, 2000). Market makers followed 
numerous illicit practices such as price collusion or the spreading of private information. These 
practices belonged to a collective pattern: most market makers observed social norms in order 
to increase significantly their income at the expense of the customers. The evidence illustrates 
the influence of the social structure on individuals’ behaviours and on the progress of 
transactions.  
Although standard economics does study social interactions, it favours an atomistic point of 
view; individuals are astructural (Degenne and Forsé, 1994). The theory disregards the social 
context, since markets are assumed to be competitive and the price mechanism allows 
mediation between anonymous individuals (Hirschman, 1977). On the contrary, Granovetter 
puts forward a conception of exchange which highlights the embeddedness of economic actions 
within social structures: “the argument that the behaviour and institutions to be analyzed are so 
constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding” (1985, p. 482). Even if the argument takes into account the role of social 
structures, it remains “a programmatic statement” (Uzzi, 1996)1.  
This paper aims to explain how non-competitive behaviours emerged on the NASDAQ, 
through a concrete view of embeddedness. Game theory tools and particularly Kreps’ model of 
reputation are mobilised (Kreps, 1990a, 1990b). At first glance, Kreps’ model belongs to an 
under-socialised view of action: “narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-interest” induces the 
behaviours of economic actors (Granovetter, 1985, p. 485). However, a rereading of this model 
discloses its important implicit content, shedding light on its structuralist dimension and 
consequently helping to explain the way social structures govern actors’ behaviours (Guennif, 
2000). In other words, the purpose of this paper is to initiate a link between Granovetter’s works 
on embeddedness and game theory, by means of an interdisciplinary method.  
Firstly, the main conclusions of the investigations conducted by the SEC and the Department 
of Justice about the deficiencies of the NASDAQ in 1994-1996 are scrutinised. Evidence shows 
that some non-competitive behaviour had been stimulated by the social structure of the 
NASDAQ. Secondly, after analysing Kreps’ model, we describe the role of trust, rational motives 
and social norms in the functioning of social structures. These elements generate a particular 
enforcement that sustains non-competitive behaviours and underlies the progress of 
transactions on this market.  
2. Impediments to price competition on the NASDAQ stock market 
The SEC’s investigation revealed that the NASDAQ has not always operated in an open and 
freely competitive manner. “NASDAQ market makers have engaged in a variety of abusive 
practices to suppress competition and mislead customers” (US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 1996, p. 3). In this section, we describe the main anti-competitive practices 
highlighted by the investigations. Then, we show that the market makers’ behaviours have been 
influenced by the structure of the NASDAQ Stock Market. This approach corroborates the 
embeddedness argument of Granovetter: market makers’ behaviours are constrained by social 
relations.  
                                                 
1 Since 1985, several authors have proposed a view of embeddedness and described the way social 
structures influence individuals’ behaviours in ways neglected by standard economy theory (Zuckin and 
Dimaggio, 1990; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati et al., 2000).  
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2. 1. A brief description of the NASDAQ Stock Market in 1994 
Initially intended to enhance the efficiency of the Over-The-Counter (OTC) market for stocks, 
the NASDAQ, founded in 1971, has experienced remarkable growth and represents a serious 
competitive alternative to the dominant equity exchange in the US, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).  
The NASDAQ market is a telecommunications network linking thousands of geographically 
dispersed market participants. This is exclusively a dealer’s market, in which a number of 
brokers-dealers make markets in the same security2. Making a market consists in standing 
ready to buy and sell securities at displayed prices. The market makers in NASDAQ quote two 
prices: a “bid” price, at which they are willing to buy the security, and an “ask” price, at which 
they are willing to sell the security. Each issuer has at least two market makers for its stock, but 
the average stock has eleven market makers.  
Market makers seek profit by buying at lower prices and selling at higher prices (a market 
maker’s bid price will always be lower than their ask price). The difference between the ask 
price and the bid price is called the “dealer spread”. The spread represents part of the market 
maker’s potential compensation. Market makers play an important role in financial markets. 
Demand for market making generally arises because buyers and sellers of securities do not 
arrive at the market at the same time or with the same quantities to trade. The market maker is 
thus said to provide immediacy to the market (O’Hara, 1995, Schwartz, 1991).  
The quotes are displayed on the NASDAQ market’s electronic quotation system. The highest 
bid and lowest ask prices are also separately displayed together as the “inside quotes”, and the 
difference between the two is called the “inside spread”. Display of the inside quotes allows a 
viewer to observe immediately the best prices quoted on the NASDAQ market for both buying 
and selling a given security.  
Market makers in NASDAQ have to respect certain rules. They must display two-sided 
quotes in all stocks in which they choose to make a market, from 9.30 a.m. to 4.00 p.m., from 
Monday to Friday. They have to propose firm quotes. When executing a customer order, market 
makers are required to seek the most favourable terms for the customer under the 
circumstances. Market makers must also report their trades to the NASDAQ market on time. 
Created in 1939, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) operates and regulates 
the NASDAQ3.  
2. 2. The price convention and other market makers’ non-competitive behaviours 
In 1994, an article by Christie and Schultz revealed larger dealers’ spreads on NASDAQ 
than on the NYSE. As a result, the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice began an 
antitrust investigation of NASDAQ market makers, while the SEC began an investigation of the 
NASD (US Department of Justice, 1996, US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996). 
These investigations involved extensive analysis of market data, interviews with market 
participants, and review of taped conversations between market makers4. Both investigative 
teams found several abusive practices.  
                                                 
2 In a dealer’s market, the market makers or dealers offer bid and ask prices continuously. The alternative 
organisation is an order-driven market where the prices are determined by the confrontation between the 
buyers’ orders and the sellers’ orders.  
3 Although the NASD is a Self Regulation Organisation, it is still under the control of the SEC.  
4 The Department of Justice conducted numerous telephone and in-person interviews of current and 
former NASDAQ stock traders and investors, and listened to approximately 4500 hours of audiotapes of 
telephone calls between stock traders employed by the defendants and other market makers. It also 
analysed data showing all market makers quote changes on NASDAQ during a twenty-month period 
between December 1993 and July 1995.  
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Firstly, NASDAQ market makers widely followed a price convention. This convention was 
used to determine the increments by which they would adjust the displayed quotes. Market 
makers testified that under the convention, stocks in which dealers were quoting spreads of 
$3/4 or more had to be quoted in even-eighths (i.e. $1/4, $1/2, $3/4), thereby giving rise to a 
minimum inside spread of $1/4. Stocks with dealer spreads lower than $3/4 could be quoted in 
both even and odd-eighths, thereby allowing a minimum inside spread of $1/8. Therefore, the 
price convention limited the flexibility and competitiveness of price quotation in the NASDAQ 
market. In the case of quoted spreads equal to or greater than $3/4, the avoidance of odd-
eighth quote increments meant that the inside spread could not be narrowed to $1/8. On one 
side, as the spread represents part of the market markers’ compensation for providing 
immediacy, the convention resulted in a larger compensation for them. On the other side, 
market makers’ adherence to this price convention often increased the transaction costs paid by 
customers. In effect, the price convention resulted in wider inside spreads, which caused trades 
to be executed at prices that were less favourable for investors5.  
Secondly, many NASDAQ market makers also adhered to a size convention, under which 
they did not display a new inside quote unless they were willing to trade in an amount 
substantially greater than the minimum volume required by NASD rules. In 1994, these rules 
required market makers to be willing to trade at least 1,000 shares at their quoted prices for the 
more actively traded stocks and lesser amounts for other NASDAQ stocks. The size convention 
had an anti-competitive effect. It inhibited price transparency by limiting quote changes and 
resulted in large spreads.  
Thirdly, the investigations established that a number of NASDAQ marker makers 
coordinated quotations, trades and trade reports with other NASDAQ market makers. On 
numerous occasions, market makers asked colleagues to shift their displayed quotations in a 
particular direction in order to help the requesting market maker to trade at the most favourable 
prices. Cooperating market makers acceded to these requests as they expected the requesting 
market maker to reciprocate in the future. Such cooperative activity improperly influenced 
prices, often at the expense of investors. Moreover, evidence demonstrated that market makers 
regularly shared information relating to the size of customer orders and sometimes to the 
identity of the customer. Market makers also shared information concerning their own inventory 
positions, their intended trading strategies and future quote movements. These practices, 
viewed as “courtesy”, could conflict with the basic obligations of a broker-dealer toward his 
customers. For example, revealing the size of a customer order could be detrimental to the 
ability of the customer to obtain the best execution.  
Fourthly, the investigation revealed numerous violations of the firm quote rule by NASDAQ 
market makers. Market makers have a fundamental obligation to honour their quotations. 
Failure to honour quotations deprived investors of the liquidity market makers could provide. For 
instance, market makers at times backed away from their trading obligations to avoid unwanted 
orders.  
Finally, we can mention the practice of “late trade reporting”. Numerous market makers 
repeatedly failed to report NASDAQ transactions on an accurate and timely basis. The 
Commission staff calculated that at least 3.6% of all NASDAQ trades in the period between 
February and December 1994 were reported late. During the same period, late trades 
accounted for only 0.9% of reported trades on the New York Stock Exchange. As reports of 
large trades are more likely to be market sensitive, market makers seeking to fill an order or 
cover a position may have a greater incentive to delay the reporting of large trades.  
In summary, according to the investigation reports, market makers widely followed 
conventions, during the period 1994-1996, that were opposed to the general rules of the SEC 
governing the functioning of American financial markets. One important issue relates to the way 
the behaviours described above expanded. In other words, how did non-competitive practices 
emerge and spread on the NASDAQ?  
                                                 
5 Recently, US equity markets have moved to decimal quotations. 
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2. 3. Social relations on the NASDAQ  
When questioned about these non-competitive practices, market markers insisted 
paradoxically on their ethical nature, which, they argued, justified the use of sanctions. The 
NASDAQ pricing convention was generally considered as a pricing “ethic”, “tradition” or 
“professional norm”. Violating the convention (in the parlance of market makers “breaking the 
spread”) was regarded as “unprofessional” or “unethical” trading behaviour (US Department of 
Justice, 1996, p. 21). Market makers who deviated from the convention were derisively said to 
create a “Chinese market”. Numerous witnesses testified to this fact. One market maker 
admitted that he telephoned another market maker to make him change his quotation: “To get 
him to get his increment and his spread to conform to what I thought was the right thing to do” 
(US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996, p. 18).  
“Insert Evidence 1” 
Remarkably, market makers were not alone in perceiving the price convention as a 
professional norm. According to the Letter of the Securities Traders Association of New-York 
(3rd quarter, 1989), “It is clearly unethical to make a Chinese market”. During a meeting in June 
1990, the NASD’s Trading Committee also concluded that the price convention was an internal 
ethical issue.  
Market makers enforced adherence to the price convention in different ways. Traders 
testified that they were taught (by the senior traders) to follow the convention. Therefore, they 
followed it and they expected other traders to follow it as well.  
In addition, market makers who violated the price convention were subjected to harassing 
telephone calls. Traders testified that the telephone calls were effective in deterring market 
makers from entering quotes that were inconsistent with the pricing convention. In general, the 
mere threat of such harassment was sufficient to discourage market makers from violating the 
convention. One trader explained why, when he was a junior trader, these telephone calls 
dissuaded him from narrowing spreads, stating: “because, many years ago, as a junior trader, I 
wanted to be accepted” (US SEC, 1996, p. 18).  
“Insert Evidence 2” 
Firms that repeatedly entered quotations in violation of the quoting convention were 
punished. The most effective mechanism was the refusal to deal. A refusal to deal has negative 
consequences for market makers. For example, when a market maker does not want to fill a 
retail or institutional order from his own account, he must be able to find other market makers 
willing to fill this order. Otherwise, his clients will soon look elsewhere for trading services. 
Consequently, the threat that other firms will not trade with them was often sufficient to 
discourage market makers from violating the convention.  
When a market maker violated the convention, he was subject to harassment and 
punishment. He no longer had access to the informal resources of the traders’ network and his 
remuneration therefore fell. If, on the other hand, he followed the convention, then he gained 
access to private information, and could take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
network.  
In conclusion, the investigations conducted by the SEC and the US Department of Justice 
revealed the influence of the NASDAQ’s structure on the behaviours of market makers. In order 
to understand this influence more clearly, we shall illustrate the embeddedness argument by 
means of Kreps’ reputation model. Even if Granovetter (1985) asserts that game theory 
propositions belong to an under-socialised view of social relations, we now propose a new 
reading of Kreps’ reputation model. This rereading makes it possible to overcome the under-
socialised bias and, above all, to grasp the way social structures may influence individuals’ 
behaviour.  
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3. Kreps’ model of reputation: from an atomistic to a structuralist view of interaction  
For transactions in which free-riding behaviour is a feature, game theory tries to define the 
conditions required for the emergence of cooperative behaviour and the achievement of an 
optimal equilibrium. In this perspective, Kreps asserts that the prisoner’s dilemma is solved in 
infinitely repeated games among n players when a self-enforcing mechanism built upon strict 
economic incentives produces trust and induces cooperative behaviour. This mechanism is 
reputation. It satisfies a huge theoretical objective: the obtaining of a private arrangement 
capable of sustaining spot-market transactions. Yet, according to us, reputation operates within 
social structures where the embeddedness of players activates social mechanisms for the 
performance of transactions. Hence, reputation and others mechanisms such as trust, solidarity 
and ostracism are part of a social arrangement that underlies the performance of any 
transaction, such as those between market makers.  
3. 1. The atomistic dimension and private arrangement  
Kreps analyses a very particular game. On first sight, it is an one-round game: an actor Ai 
must decide whether or not to trust an actor B. Ai knows that if he elects to interact with B, the 
latter can choose to act opportunistically, as a free rider. B may impose severe losses on Ai and 
obtain maximum gains. This is the “selfish temptation” (Axelrod, 1984). Trust is the risk Ai takes 
on B’s behaviour (Luhmann, 1979; Dasgupta, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Lorenz, 1993; Guennif, 
2000).  
In fact, the game is repeated: B must successively decide whether to honour or to abuse the 
trust of A1, A2, A3, ... An. The game thus begins with a single transaction between actors A1 and 
B and continues with another transaction between A2 and B, and so on. So, “instead of having 
one individual who offers trust and a second who honours or abuses that trust, we have a 
sequence of individuals A who must choose whether or not to trust a single trading partner B” 
(Kreps, 1990a, p. 106). Kreps posits that the game is infinitely repeated: there is a 90 percent 
chance that another transaction will follow the present one.  
Kreps then specifies the conditions required for the transactions between actors Ai and B to 
take place. On the one hand, any Ai will only trust B if B has not abused the trust of his previous 
partners. Thus, the past behaviour or the reputation of B determines the choice of each Ai for 
the present round. On the other hand, B knows that if he wants to exchange with another Ai for 
the next round, he must preserve his reputation. In other words, he must honour his partner’s 
trust in the present round. To sum up, B maintains his reputation unsullied by honouring Ai‘s 
trust, and thus obtains the possibility of repeated transactions with them. In this way, B gains 
maximum profits through repeated rounds. He receives $10 in each round, according to the 
Kreps’ Trust game (1990a, p. 100). On the contrary, if B abuses the trust of the current Ai, his 
reputation is irremediably sullied. He gets the maximum pay-off resulting from defective 
behaviour ($15), but he can no longer transact with Ai. By choosing opportunistic behaviour, B 
renounces the $10 for each honest future transaction he would have had with Ai. B will therefore 
choose to protect his reputation, an asset that will give him high levels of income in the future. 
Each Ai knows that B is rational and will keep his reputation unsullied by honouring the trust of 
his partners. For this reason, each Ai will decide to trust B and will choose to transact with him. 
Thus, reputation is a “process-based” mechanism linked to the repetition of transactions 
(Zucker, 1986 p. 60). Finally, the mechanism is built upon the expectation that the business 
partner will behave more or less as he did in the past6.  
Ultimately, Kreps’ propositions overcome the prisoner’s dilemma and satisfy significant 
theoretical objectives. For example, as an informal self-enforcing mechanism, reputation 
supports the progress of spot-market transactions. Reputation produces the trust necessary for 
                                                 
6 Similarly, Breton and Wintrobe (1986) claim that trust results from belief formulations in repeated 
transactions. The perspective of future gain motivates ex-post good behaviour and legitimates ex-ante 
trust between players (Meidinger et al., 1999).  
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the occurrence of transactions that contain a risk of opportunistic behaviour, of strategic or 
behavioural uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). Thanks to reputation, a “self-enforcing 
arrangement” can be found; there is no need for any third party involvement or arbitration 
(Lester, 1980; Klein, 1980). To put it differently, the progress of transactions relies on a private 
arrangement, which is all the more efficient in the neo-institutional sense of the term. The 
informal self-enforcing mechanism explains how transactions take place without any complete 
contingent contract7. Trust thus based on reputation saves on transaction costs (Arrow, 1974; 
Leibenstein, 1987; Kreps, 1990a; Sako, 1992; Guennif, 2000).  
Despite these important theoretical points, the trust game has certain limits (Kreps, 1990a, p. 
103). For instance, Kreps recognises that his construction “depends crucially on each A seeing 
precisely how B has behaved previously” (Kreps, 1990b, p. 71) and leads to many equilibriums. 
B may say to Ai “I intend to honour your trust two out of three times and to abuse it once every 
three times” (Kreps, 1990a, p. 102). The 90 percent chance that the game will go on after the 
present round is also arguable. Nevertheless, our objection lies on a different level: the model 
does not belong to an atomistic view of interaction. A rereading of this model discloses its 
structuralist dimension.  
3. 2. The structuralist dimension of the model  
Strictly, following Kreps’ propositions, reputation produces a particular link between each Ai 
and B, i.e. trust. Trust motivates cooperative behaviour and induces transactions. In the 
diagram below, this trust links figures in bold type to indicate that it supports an exchange that 
involves the two players. According to us, the argument is much more complex than Kreps’ 
assertions suggest. Any transaction between Ai and B occurs thanks to several trust links. In 
order to make this point explicit, let us consider a transaction: A2 must decide to trade with B. 
What are the conditions of trust among players and what are the conditions for the occurrence 
of a transaction?  
Firstly, for reputation to be the self-enforcing mechanism, A2 must be able to observe B’s 
behaviour during the previous transaction. Kreps assumes such a capacity. On the contrary, 
Kandori argues that “the agent only observes the results of the trades he is engaged in” (1992, 
p. 65). Because of imperfect observability, A2 identifies at best A1 and requests his “private 
information”, asks for his “personal experience” (p. 64). Then, the decision whether to trust B 
depends on A2‘s access to the information A1 holds and above all on the credit A2 gives to this 
information. As shown in the diagram, another trust link appears and underlies Kreps’ reputation 
construction: if A2 trusts A1 to communicate his private information without any distortion, and if 
A1 claims that B acts honestly, then A2 elects to trust B and exchange with him8. When one of 
these conditions is not satisfied, A2 refuses to trust B and renounces trade with him9.  
The prime trust link that binds A2 and A1 is a necessary condition for the development of trust 
between A2 and B. A1 is “a trustworthy informant” (Granovetter, 1985), an “intermediary in trust” 
(Coleman, 1990; Nooteboom, 1999; Uzzi, 1996), a “third party” (Burt, 1996). Trust connecting 
A2 and B displays a medial nature since it presupposes a former trust link between A1 and A2. 
Hence, one may consider the existence of a “trust chain” (Coleman, 1990).  
                                                 
7 This is a critical point since actors are unable to draft contingent contracts; they face difficulties in 
measuring individual performance, in observing compliance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Hart, 1996) 
and in predicting. Finally, bounded rationality impedes the drafting of complete contracts (Simon, 1978). 
8 In other words, to trust B, A2 must have information about B’s reputation (his past behaviour), and A1’s 
reputation (his capacity to give good information about his partners’ behaviour).  
9 If the transaction ends up with problems between A1 and B, A1 can declare that he has been cheated by 
an opportunist. In the same circumstances, B can declare he has fulfilled his obligations, that A1 was 
unlucky. Therefore, the question of the credit A2 gives to A1 arises. A1 may declare that he has been 
cheated to hide his undue requirements. Then B may refuse to commit his reputation and may renounce 
trade with such individuals (Lorenz, 1988).  
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Secondly, before trusting B, A2 must be sure that any opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
B will be punished by A3, i.e. the player who will next decide whether to exchange with B. 
Therefore, A2‘s trust relies on the belief that A3 will ostracise B in the case of opportunism. 
Introducing a doubt about B’s next partner, it follows that the trust A2 invests in B depends on 
the belief any Ai will boycott transaction with an opportunist B. Thus, as shown in the diagram, 
A2 decides to trust B and exchange with him under the condition that A2 believes that Ai will 
ostracise B if he defects.  
Consequently, to ostracise B for opportunistic behaviour, all Ai must ultimately rely on the 
private information A2 delivers. Ai necessarily trusts A2. Trust between A2 and Ai is therefore 
mutual, as the two-way arrows in the following diagram illustrate.  
To sum up, the accomplishment of a transaction between any Ai and B is not due to a single 
trust link between the two players, as Kreps stated. According to our argument, it relies on 
several trust ties: A2 trades with B if he trusts him, if he trusts his peers and if they trust him in 
return. When one of these trust links is not fulfilled, A2 renounces the exchange with B. These 
trust connections make up the following “chain of trust”:  
“Insert Figure 1” 
At this point, a significant gap arises between the reputation argument set out by Kreps and 
the outcome of a careful examination of his model. Following the latter, all the conditions 
required for the progress of any transaction ultimately suggest that players operate within social 
structures. Thus, the assertion that transactions take place within a private arrangement 
characterised by a self-enforcing mechanism is questionable. Our argument is that transactions 
take place thanks to a “social arrangement” (Uzzi, 1996) featuring a specific enforcement that 
we shall define below. In other words, against all expectations, a new reading of this model can 
be used to illustrate Granovetter’s embeddedness hypothesis10.  
3. 3. Embeddedness and non-private enforcement of transactions  
According to us, reputation operates neither solely nor within a private arrangement. The 
reputation mechanism is one among several elements comprising the “structural enforcement” 
(Guennif and Plociniczak, 2002), which ensures the accomplishment of transactions within 
social structures.  
In sociological literature, a social structure represents an organisation of economic life in 
which formal and informal social relations among actors matter. Here, social relations among 
players contribute to the progress of any transaction on the basis of trust given or received 
within the network, i.e. “a saturated structure in which every actor is directly linked to every other 
individual” (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1990, p. 175) and where “a specific type of relation links a 
defined set of persons” (Mitchell, 1969, p. 45).  
These social structures influence economic decisions: all transactions are shaped by and 
depend on social relations among actors. This influence refers to Granovetter’s embeddedness. 
Accordingly, transactions occur within a web of social relations whereby actors are bound and 
influenced in one way or another by systems of more or less stable and lasting social relations, 
within which tangible and intangible resources such as materials, money, information, 
knowledge, norms or rules diffuse and circulate (Guennif and Plociniczak, 2002).  
Concretely, the influence of social structures on players’ behaviour is possible through the 
operation of a non-private enforcement of the accomplishment of transactions. Enforcement 
refers to the formal and informal mechanisms defined and used by actors to inhibit opportunism 
                                                 
10 Given their appurtenance to standard economic theory and its under-socialised view of economic 
behaviour, Granovetter argues that the reputation models proposed by game theorists are useless for 
capturing the essence and effective influence of embeddedness (1985, p. 490).  
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and to incite cooperative behaviour so that transactions can take place (Guennif and 
Plociniczak, 2002)11. For us, the acknowledgement of embeddedness clarifies the path from 
private enforcement to structural enforcement, in which reputation plays a role and players’ 
motivations for action are much more complex.  
As figure 2 summarises, trade conditions result on the left-hand side from an under-
socialised vision of action. In order to fulfil theoretical propositions, social structure is neglected 
and a private arrangement is proposed through the reputation mechanism. The enforcement of 
transaction relies strictly on a bilateral foundation: two players trust each other and exchange 
thanks to formal and informal mechanisms built upon economic incentives. These mechanisms 
are defined and used by players to prevent opportunism from their partners and to facilitate the 
accomplishment of transactions. In this perspective, reputation produces economic incentives 
not to cheat and induces individual actions sufficient for the efficient enforcement of spot-market 
transactions: A2 trusts B and agrees to exchange with him because he believes B will not cheat 
because he values his reputation as the condition for present and future gains.  
On the right-hand side, social structure is taken into account. Consequently, trust is all the 
more important as a lubricant for its functioning. Players’ behaviour is influenced by the social 
context, which makes it easier to resort to a structural enforcement that goes beyond the private 
arrangement, the bilateral enforcement described by Kreps. This enforcement expresses the 
idea that relationships between actors shape behaviour in ways neglected by standard 
economic theory. Resorting to social mechanisms hinders opportunism and induces cooperative 
behaviour during market transactions. Hence, the rational motive (preserving reputation) and 
social norms (solidarity, ostracism or reciprocity) are both involved in the accomplishment of 
transactions.  
Indeed, Granovetter’s proposition concerning the joint involvement of selfish and unselfish 
motives in the accomplishment of transactions is confirmed. B protects his reputation as an 
asset that represents important future income. In addition, A2 chooses to exchange with B 
because he believes that peers will sanction any defection by refusing to transact with B in the 
future12. Ostracism is therefore an internal voice attitude that derives from trustworthiness, 
loyalty towards peers (Hirschman, 1977). It is a social norm deriving from potential sanction 
within a community when improper behaviour is observed (Elster, 1989). Therefore, utility 
maximisation and social norms play both a major role in the functioning of social structures. To 
put it differently, the rationality principle is insufficient and other motives, such as loyalty and 
solidarity, are essential for explaining individuals’ behaviour (Arrow, 1971; Boyer and Orléan, 
1997)13. To sum up, whereas bilateral enforcement logically emphasises strict economic 
incentives or selfish motivations, structural enforcement stresses the importance of both selfish 
and unselfish motivations.  
“Insert figure 2” 
Similarly, on the NASDAQ, market makers act inside a social structure, a “professional 
network” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002) where a chain of trust underpins the accomplishment of any 
                                                 
11 For a presentation of the operation of the two kinds of enforcement in social networks, see Guennif and 
Plociniczak (2002).  
12 In the same vein, Kandori describes “community enforcement”: “dishonest behaviour against one 
partner causes sanction by other members in the society” (1992: 63). This “community enforcement” 
also prevails for peers that do not sanction the defector (64). Structural enforcement is also defined as 
“community governance” or “network governance” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Jones et al., 1997).  
13 Analysing industrial districts, Saglio reveals how individuals observe a set of social rules that contains 
economic rules (1991, p. 531). Studying industrial vertical disintegration in Japan in the 60s and 70s, 
Dore notes that subcontracting relations involve both “benevolence and self-interest” (1983, p. 170). 
Hirschman insists on “sweet trade”. According to him, trade is communication based on closed contacts 
among people who make promises, trust each other, claim and complain (1984, p. 69). Williamson admits 
that social norms such as ostracism sustain transactions. They limit self-interest, “individual 
aggressiveness” (1975, pp. 106-107).  
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transaction and where both selfish and unselfish motives operate14. A market maker A2 agrees 
to exchange with another market maker B because he chooses to trust him. He does so in order 
to increase his gain and obtain a higher compensation. A2 assumes that B will follow informal 
rules such as a price convention or a quantity convention because these non-competitive 
conventions may increase market markers’ compensation. Nonetheless, he assumes that if B 
defects and decides not to follow such conventions, he will never receive this compensation. B’s 
defection will impose losses on A2.  
In addition, A2 trusts B because he assumes that the Ai adhere to certain common rules: - 
social norms15. More precisely, individuals do not respect common rules unconditionally, 
following what Granovetter calls an over-socialised view of action. Collectively, players define 
and use social mechanisms expecting that most of the time these mechanisms will work to their 
advantage and only sometimes impose costs on them16. A2 anticipates that peers will punish B 
if he defects. B will be subjected to harassment and above all, he will be ostracised. The Ai will 
impede B’s access to network information and other tangible and intangible resources. Thus, 
maverick market makers who often improved the best quote would not get an execution. This 
refusal to trade is known as being “traded through”. Maverick market makers were also subject 
to “backing away” and “being made last call” by other market makers. “Backing away” involved 
the failure of one market maker to honour its posted quote to another market maker, as required 
by SEC and NASD rules. Being made “last call” involved only trading with the maverick market 
maker when the market began to turn against the maverick, or when a market maker had no 
other alternative but to trade with him. Victim of one of these sanctions, defector B will not 
increase his compensation.  
As a result, the market makers followed the price convention, quoted large dealer spreads 
and increased their profit at the expense of their customers. The price convention limited the 
flexibility and competitiveness of price quotations in the NASDAQ Stock Market.  
4. Discussion  
We intend to develop a theoretical contribution to embeddedness based on game theory 
tools. The passage from the bilateral enforcement described by standard economic theory to 
structural enforcement throws light on the influence of social structures. Reputation is one of the 
mechanisms that underpin the accomplishment of spot-market transactions. As individuals are 
not astructural, social norms or common rules underpin every transaction. Using this theoretical 
approach, we can describe the way the NASDAQ social structure in the mid-eighties influenced 
market makers’ behaviour and induced non-competitive practices. 
A few days after the publication by the Wall Street Journal of a paper presenting the findings 
of Christie and Schultz (1994), four prominent NASDAQ stocks previously quoted only in even 
eighths, suddenly began to be quoted in both even and odd eighths (Smith, Selway and 
McCornick, 1998). In 1996, the publication of the US SEC and DOJ investigation reports put an 
end to the price convention and other non-competitive practices. The conclusions of these 
reports brought about two major reforms of the NASDAQ market organisation.  
Firstly, the Rudman Commission (SEC, 1996) recommended more separation between the 
regulatory objectives of the NASD and the organisation/competitive objectives of the NASDAQ. 
A new subsidiary, NASD regulation, Inc., was founded and began operating in February of 1996 
in order to promote fair representativity within the NASDAQ market’s board of directors. At the 
                                                 
14 The balance between selfish and unselfish motivations is also presented as a particular trade-off 
between competitive and cooperative behaviours within industrial districts, networks or communities 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Bernstein, 1992; Gulati et al. 1999).  
15 Sociological studies on financial markets shed light on the role of the network (Baker, 1984), the role 
of the exchange organisation (Abolafia, 1984) or the role of local norms (Hassoun, 2000).  
16 A market maker admitted that in the absence of the price convention and in certain instances, he would 
have used odd-eighths quote increments (US SEC Report, 1996).  
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time, in 1994, the board of directors was in majority composed of representatives of market 
maker firms.  
Secondly, the SEC adopted the “Order Handling Rules” (OHR) intended to change the way 
the NASDAQ operates. The first component of the OHR is the Limit Order Display Rule (SEC 
Rule 11Ac1-4). This rule stipulates, for all NASDAQ securities, that the public limit orders17 
should be reflected in the Best Bid and Offer disseminated by the market. The second 
component of OHR is new amendments to the Quote Rule prohibiting market makers from 
placing one quote in NASDAQ and a different one in an Electronic Communications Network 
(ECN). The OHR applies principles associated with agency auction markets to a quote-driven 
dealer market (Smith, 1998). It introduces competition between market maker quotes and public 
limit orders, and contributes to narrow spreads.  
Today, although collusive practices have not completely disappeared because of the 
reforms, they nevertheless only affect a very low volume of transactions and few stocks. 
However, some “courtesy” practices such as “preference trading” remain. According to this 
practice, brokers and market makers are allowed to direct or “preference” an order to any 
market maker who agrees in advance to execute orders at the best-quoted prices, regardless of 
the price actually quoted by the market maker to whom the order is directed (Christie and 
Schultz 1994; Godek, 1996). Market makers may “direct trades based on non-price 
considerations, such as established business relationships” (Godek, 1996, p. 466)18.  
As a final point, it is important to underline the fact that social structures do not only produce 
non-competitive practices. They may also generate social rules which represent important 
lubricants for the functioning of the market (Arrow, 1974). Although they are competitors, market 
makers frequently need to trade with one another. For instance, a market maker may call on 
another market maker’s services in order to reduce the risk related to a short position. When a 
trader sells stocks that he does not own, he can ask another trader to sell him these stocks to 
balance his position. These social rules help to introduce more flexibility in market markers’ 
operations without being detrimental to investors’ interests. In fact, investors can buy or sell 
stocks without delay. Ultimately, the social structure improves the fluidity of the market’s 
functioning.  
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 Evidence 1  
Q: …Would somebody making a Chinese market cause another market maker to get 
angered? 
A: I believe that’s possible. 
Q: Under what circumstances? 
A: …I think Chinese markets, as they‘re called, were looked down upon, so are 
considered unethical. So by making a Chinese market, you’re making yourself unethical 
and, therefore, I guess upsetting other market makers. 
US Department of Justice, 1996: 21, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0739.htm 
 
Evidence 2 
Trader 1: Who trades CMCAF in your place without yelling it out? 
Trader 2: … Sammy 
Trader 1: Sammy who? 
Trader 2: It may be the foreign department… 
Trader 1: What? 
Trader 2: The foreign didn’t realize they had to trade it. 
Trade 1: Well, he’s trading it in an eighth and he’s embarrassing… 
Trade 2: … foreign department 
Trader 1: He’s trading it in eighths and he’s embarrassing your firm. 
Trader 2: I understand. 
Trader 1: You know. I would tell him to straighten up his act and stop being a moron. 
US Department of Justice, 1996: 24. http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0739.htm 
 16
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Actor A2
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Figure 1. “Chain of trust” in a transaction between A2 and B 
 
 
Fig.2 Atomistic and structuralist views of Kreps ’reputation model
Proposition 1. Proposition 2.
Transactions ’schedules in a atomistic view
B values his reputation
A2 trust B
Transaction takes place
B and A2 receive their gains
Reputationis a self-enforcing mechanism. 
Trust is built upon reputation.
Trust between A2 and B settles the progress 
of transaction
Utility maximisation sustains action
Transactions ’schedules in a structuralist view
B and A2 receive their gains
Transaction takes place
A2 trust B
B values this
 reputation
A2 observes 
social norms
Obvious trust between A et B is built upon B ’s 
reputation and trust among A.
« Ubiquitous » trust settles transaction between A
 and B.
Utility maximisation and social norms (solidarity , 
loyalty) sustain action. 
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